It’s time. Time to prepare. And some countries have already published their roadmaps to prepare.
Quantum computing could enable faster and more sophisticated cyberattacks, compromising mobile banking, e-commerce, and fintech platforms. Government organizations must proactively assess and mitigate these risks, which requires significant resources and expertise.
The Canadian government's Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) strategy, announced in 2025, is a proactive effort to secure federal IT systems against future quantum computing threats, particularly the "harvest now, decrypt later" risk where encrypted data collected today could be decrypted by quantum computers in the future. The strategy is detailed in the "Roadmap for the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography for the Government of Canada (ITSM.40.001)" issued by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) on June 23, 2025. Canada’s new PQC roadmap for government units produced by the Communications Security Establishment Canada | Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada and Canadian Centre for Cybersecurity the recommended roadmap for the Government of Canada (GC) to “migrate non-classified IT systems to use PQC, including milestones, deliverables, and guidance for departmental planning and execution.”
Image source: Brian Lenahan/Midjourney
The roadmap applies to non-classified federal IT systems, with separate guidance for classified or PROTECTED C systems. It covers all public-key cryptography instances, including VPNs, PKI, and digital certificates. Departments must conduct cryptographic inventories, appoint PQC migration leads, and ensure new procurements support PQC (validated via the Cryptographic Module Validation Program). The roadmap emphasizes early vendor engagement and crypto-agility to adapt to evolving standards.
Table 1 - Canada PQC Roadmap
Key Elements of the Canadian PQC Strategy
Clear Timelines and Milestones:
April 2026: All federal departments and agencies must develop an initial PQC migration plan, identifying vulnerable cryptographic systems and outlining transition strategies. A Designated Official for Cyber Security (DOCS) or equivalent executive is recommended to lead this effort.
Starting April 2026: Annual progress reports are required to ensure accountability and track migration efforts, integrated into existing oversight mechanisms by the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS).
End of 2031: High-priority systems, especially those handling sensitive data over public networks (e.g., UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECTED A, and PROTECTED B information), must be fully migrated to quantum-safe encryption.
End of 2035: All remaining non-classified federal IT systems must complete PQC migration, with legacy quantum-vulnerable algorithms (e.g., RSA, ECC) fully removed or mitigated.
Phased Implementation Approach:
Preparation Phase: Departments establish governance structures, such as migration committees with senior leadership and cross-departmental stakeholders (e.g., IT, finance, procurement). This phase includes securing funding, updating procurement policies to ensure PQC-ready technology, and educating staff on quantum threats.
Identification Phase: Comprehensive cryptographic inventories are conducted to identify all systems, devices, and applications using vulnerable public-key cryptography. This includes servers, databases, network appliances, and mobile devices, with a focus on prioritizing systems at risk of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks.
Transition Phase: Departments upgrade or replace systems with PQC algorithms, using quantum-safe tunneling or network isolation for legacy systems that cannot be immediately updated. The roadmap emphasizes crypto-agility (the ability to swap algorithms easily) and phased transitions to maintain compatibility during the shift.
Alignment with International Standards:
The strategy leverages standardized PQC algorithms from the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as outlined in CCCS’s guidance (ITSP.40.111). The CCCS also participates in NIST’s PQC standardization process and other international standards bodies to ensure interoperability. Guidance on securely configuring network protocols (ITSP.40.062) will be updated as PQC algorithms are integrated into standards, ensuring compatibility with global partners. With Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency, and the new 2025 International Call-to-Action, a focus on these dimensions might be most effective.
Whole-of-Government Coordination:
The CCCS, as part of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), leads as the technical authority, providing guidance and recommendations. The TBS oversees policy and accountability, while Shared Services Canada (SSC) supports infrastructure modernization. Departments are responsible for their own migration plans, covering both SSC-managed and independently managed IT systems, including contracted cloud services.
Focus on Awareness and Ecosystem Support:
The strategy emphasizes raising awareness of quantum threats across government and the public. The CCCS’s Learning Hub provides educational resources, and the TBS’s GCxchange platform shares materials to inform stakeholders. It aligns with the National Quantum Strategy (NQS), launched in 2023, which supports PQC research, talent development, and commercialization to strengthen Canada’s quantum ecosystem. This includes collaboration with academia, industry, and international partners.
Prioritization of High-Risk Systems:
Systems handling sensitive data or operating over public networks are prioritized for early migration due to their vulnerability to quantum attacks. Criteria for prioritization include data sensitivity, lifespan, cryptographic agility, and potential impact of compromise.
Effectiveness Analysis
Strengths
Proactive and Structured Approach:
The strategy’s clear timelines (2026, 2031, 2035) and phased approach provide a structured framework, reducing ambiguity for federal departments. Requiring initial plans by April 2026 ensures early action, critical for addressing the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat. Annual reporting and TBS oversight enhance accountability, minimizing the risk of departments lagging behind. The emphasis on crypto-agility and leveraging existing IT lifecycles is practical, potentially reducing costs and disruptions.
Alignment with Global Standards:
By adopting NIST-standardized PQC algorithms and participating in international standardization, Canada ensures interoperability with allies (e.g., U.S., EU), which is crucial for secure cross-border data exchange. This also leverages global expertise, reducing the burden on Canada to develop algorithms independently.
Comprehensive Scope:
The roadmap covers all non-classified federal IT systems, addressing a broad range of vulnerabilities. The focus on high-priority systems by 2031 demonstrates an understanding of risk prioritization, particularly for data at risk of future decryption.
Integration with National Quantum Strategy:
Embedding PQC within the broader NQS (with $360 million in funding since 2023) supports research, talent development, and industry collaboration. This holistic approach could position Canada as a leader in quantum-safe cybersecurity, as noted in some analyses suggesting Canada’s potential as a PQC innovator.
Early Awareness and Education:
The emphasis on educating staff and stakeholders about quantum threats is a forward-thinking move. Early awareness can drive cultural change within government agencies, ensuring buy-in from technical and non-technical personnel.
Potential Weaknesses
Timeline Conservatism:
The 2031 deadline for high-priority systems is slightly less aggressive than the EU’s 2030 target for critical infrastructure. Some analyses suggest 2030 could be a critical “Q-Day” when quantum computers might break RSA-2048 encryption, making Canada’s 2031 target potentially risky for the most sensitive systems. While departments are encouraged to prioritize high-risk systems earlier, the lack of a formal mandate to complete critical migrations by 2030 could lead to delays, especially for agencies with complex legacy systems.
Resource and Implementation Challenges:
The roadmap acknowledges that many legacy systems may require significant refactoring or replacement, which could strain budgets and staffing. While it suggests leveraging existing IT lifecycles, the financial and human resource demands may be underestimated, particularly for smaller departments with limited expertise. The reliance on SSC for infrastructure support could create bottlenecks if SSC’s modernization efforts are not adequately resourced or coordinated.
Limited Scope to Government Systems:
Unlike the EU’s roadmap, which adopts a whole-of-society approach targeting critical infrastructure, finance, and other sectors, Canada’s roadmap focuses primarily on federal IT systems. While the NQS encourages broader adoption, the lack of a mandated timeline for private-sector or critical infrastructure PQC migration could leave vulnerabilities in Canada’s broader digital ecosystem.
Uncertainty Around Quantum Threat Timeline:
The strategy assumes quantum computers capable of breaking current cryptography may emerge in the 2030s, based on CSE assessments. However, if breakthroughs occur earlier (e.g., by 2030, as some analyses suggest), the 2031 and 2035 deadlines may be too late, exposing sensitive data to risk. The roadmap’s periodic updates to reflect technological advances are a mitigating factor, but rapid adaptation will be critical.
Dependence on External Standards:
Heavy reliance on NIST standards, while practical, means Canada’s strategy is somewhat dependent on U.S.-led developments. Any delays or flaws in NIST’s standardization process could impact Canada’s migration timeline. Additionally, limited mention of domestic PQC algorithm development may hinder Canada’s technological sovereignty in this area.
Contextual Factors and Comparative Analysis
Comparison with the EU: The EU’s roadmap, announced concurrently in June 2025, is more ambitious in scope, targeting critical infrastructure and private sectors by 2030. Canada’s government-only focus is narrower but more manageable given its federal structure. The EU’s whole-of-society approach may inspire Canada to expand its strategy to include private-sector mandates in future updates.
Global Context: The U.S. also targets 2035 for full PQC migration, aligning with Canada’s timeline for non-critical systems. This global convergence on 2035 suggests a realistic timeframe for full transitions but underscores the need for Canada to accelerate high-priority migrations to match the EU’s 2030 goal.
Technological Uncertainty: The “harvest now, decrypt later” threat is real, as adversaries could collect encrypted data today for future decryption. Canada’s emphasis on prioritizing systems at risk of this threat is prudent, but its effectiveness depends on accurate prioritization and timely execution.
How Effective Will the Strategy Be?
The Canadian PQC strategy is considered moderately to highly effective for government systems but has limitations in scope and urgency:
Strengths: Its structured approach, clear timelines, and alignment with international standards position it well to secure federal IT systems. The integration with the NQS and focus on education enhance its long-term impact, potentially making Canada a leader in PQC adoption. The phased implementation and accountability mechanisms are practical and likely to drive progress.
Weaknesses: The 2031 deadline for high-priority systems may be too conservative given potential quantum breakthroughs by 2030. The government-only focus misses opportunities to secure critical infrastructure and private sectors, which are vital for national cyber resilience. Resource constraints and reliance on external standards could also pose challenges.
Overall: The strategy is robust for its intended scope (non-classified federal systems) and demonstrates foresight in addressing quantum threats. However, to maximize effectiveness, Canada could consider accelerating high-priority migrations to 2030, expanding guidance to critical infrastructure, and investing more in domestic PQC research to reduce dependence on foreign standards. Periodic updates to the roadmap, as promised, will be crucial to adapt to evolving quantum risks.
Strategically what this demonstrates is that the Canadian Government sees this as a decade long transition. So, if you’re leading a business, your own quantum security roadmap, which should start today if you haven’t, could extend out for many years. And the details of the Canadian PQC Roadmap could assist your own organizations’ cybersecurity planning. As my colleague, CEO of Terra Quantum AG, Markus Pflitsch often says “Quantum is NOW”. And if it truly is now, then it’s time to saddle up.
Further References
NOTE: Paid subscribers will receive the full country by country report on PQC preparedness in government.
Also check out Quantum Strategy Institute’s reports on post-quantum cryptography in the US, Asia, and Europe.
Brian Lenahan is founder and chair of the Quantum Strategy Institute, author of seven Amazon published books on quantum technologies and artificial intelligence and a Substack Top 100 Rising in Technology. Brian’s focus on the practical side of technology ensures you will get the guidance and inspiration you need to gain value from quantum now and into the future. Brian does not purport to be an expert in each field or subfield for which he provides science communication.
Brian’s books are available on Amazon. Quantum Strategy for Business course is available on the QURECA platform.
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